Sometimes issue is not the exact which we trying to resolve by searching on google, I have faced this isse and search on google to resolve this issue.
I have found multiple fix on internet like enabling UAC in control panel and enabling UAC via register, but some time this issue is not resolved after made these changes.
This issue can be resolve with below simple method without enabling UAC through the Registry or without Enable UAC Using Control Panel Slider bar.
Go to Internet Explorer options and click on programs.
Under Programs check Opening Internet Explorer option, Under Choose how you open link make sure Always in Internet Explorer option is selected and Open Internet Exploere tiles on the desktop option is selected.
Once you make sure all the setting according above image, You can try opening Internet Exploer again.
Hopefully your issue resolved with these settings.
Every quarter a company that has been taken
advantage of by a serious security event, typically ransomware or
phishing, but also sometimes events more complicated. In many cases
enterprise organizations have 95% of their datacenter and end user
computing environments compromised. Not surprisingly, in examining
these events I’ve consistently noticed that common themes are present in
how they could have been mitigated. I’ve also noticed that the
“security” companies and the money spent on security remediation often
are not significantly improving the position of an organization. If you
however take the steps below, you’ll find yourself in a much better
position to dictate the security terms, rather than have them dictated
to you.
Change 1: Implement a Zero-Trust End User Computing Environment
The majority of datacenter compromises happen because an individual
end user computing device is compromised. That device is used to move
from one end user computing device to another, then to the datacenter,
until critical credentials are used to pwn the network. This is made
possible because of how we’ve constructed networks for the last 20
years. The traditional network was built around the idea of creating a
wall on the outside, then allowing largely free communications inside.
This was the model because all the applications lived in the datacenter,
with exception of very highly regulated external app vendors, like a
FIS or Fiserv. We’ve now moved to a model where applications are mostly
in the cloud, not hosted in the datacenter. Further, the assumption
that “because a device is inside our network it is secure” is obsolete
(or was never true).
This is your legacy environment.
Everything talks to everything. The only way in (or so its believed) is
through the corporate firewalls. Unfortunately, every device is
talking through the firewalls. The assumption is that if a device is on
the network, the device is “safe” and its allowed to communicate with
other parties on the network.
This is your legacy environment during a compromise. In this case,
you can see the movement from end user computing device, to another, to a
server, to the identity source, to the data… and out.
In the modern environment we see a different picture. You see the implementation of a zero trust modern desktop environment. The end user computing device is Azure AD joined, Intune managed, controlled via conditional access, and not on the same corporate network as anything else. In fact, they aren’t even allowed to talk with each other.
The end goal of implementing a zero-trust modern desktop environment
is to prevent the ease of movement in a compromise. This change alone
would have mitigated most of the ransomware attacks in the last year,
simply because of the higher difficulty to move around the network and
compromise server environments.
Another view of this here, from Microsoft’s own internal implementation: Change 2: Implement Micro-Network Segmentation in the Datacenter.
In conjunction with mitigating movement between end user computing
and the datacenter applications, the same activity is important for the
datacenter design. We’ve traditionally allowed threats to move between
application server at will. Why? Because it is hard to implement
micro-network segmentation because of the highly delineated
responsibility of our teams. Fortunately, the catalyst of the movement
to the cloud is changing this, because of the collapse of skills into
common cloud engineering teams, SREs, and DevOps.
Similar to the previous pictures, here is one that shows the movement between applications and each other during a compromise.
The above picture is obviously not a good practice. Why didn’t we
implement micro-network segmentation earlier? The diagram below shows
the different groups necessary to work together to make this better.
This shows the contrast between a vertical and horizontal network
design, moving toward micro-network segmentation of every application.
Here’s another look at it
If you combine this change with the movement of end user computing
you’ll end up with a much more architecturally difficult environment to
compromise. The change to a network design that leverages micro-network
segmentation is much easier when you leverage
infrastructure-as-code, app-as-code, config-as-code techniques, because
it forces teams to come together. The catalyst to implement these
changes is the move to the cloud, as it drives the modernization of
teams and the change of how the environment is managed.
Change 3: Protect Cloud Properties with Conditional Access
The cloud applications your teams are accessing are being protected
not by the network your end user computing devices are on, but instead
by the identity of the user. Understanding the weakness of typical
passwords we realize how much we need to advance this to a stronger
model. The term conditional access describes a state of combining
identity, multi-factor authentication, device health, and ecosystem
awareness to protect the applications.
The identity needs to be protected in conjunction with the health and
risk profile of the device, especially in the zero-trust model we’ve
talked about above. This is combined with protections like MFA or
blocking the user.
The identity of the individual is the new control
plane, leading to a vast mesh of ability to simplify the access for the
company, the apps, and the user, while making security stronger.
An interesting data point to have is less than 10% of Azure
environments have MFA enabled for administrator accounts. Let that sink
in. Less than 10% have protection beyond the user name and password to
their critical cloud administrators. The same situation exists in
Office 365. Think about how an identity of your executive assistant,
payroll assistant, or accounts payable can be used to compromise your
organization via phishing. You need to assume that you are compromised…
leverage conditional access to guard the identities and protect against
the clear and present danger.
Change 4: Have a clear identity provisioning story
What is your system of record for identity? Don’t say Active
Directory. Who is accountable for the individuals that have access to
your products and application platforms? They include employees,
customers, and partners. Your company needs clear articulation of the
system of record and process owner for your most important platforms.
What determines if an employee continues to be active in your identity
environment or not? In most cases it’s pretty weakly defined and even
more weakly managed. Let’s fix it.
Let’s first consider the employee or contractor story. The process
for provisioning should start with HR and the owner of whether an
individual is an employee or not should be governed by an HR system,
including employment (or contracting) start date, and end date. The
digital platforms then inherit from the HR system based on role and
access.
The second story is the customer story, where the product owner is
responsible for who is granted access to the platform or not. That
said, there may be millions of customers, so the real control is brought
to the customer themselves to control their identity. To help the
customers a smart organization will enable their identity layer with not
just username and password, but MFA and conditional access based on
risk profile. Thankfully, much of this is commodity now with platforms
like Azure AD B2C and B2B… vs. needing to develop the identity
environment themselves, a company can rely on major platforms like
Microsoft to contain this user environment.
The smart organizations here realize that well thought out user
provisioning and de-provisioning is the blocking and tackling of running
security for the organization. To enable this with conditional access
controls is expected, not a nice to have.
Change 5: End to End Kill Chain
The majority of companies I meet for the first time admit that they
use less than 10% of the capabilities in their security stack well.
Even more important, they’ve purchased many tools that don’t work well
together, so instead of spending time improving the security position,
they are spending time integrating, or dealing with conflicts, or
arguing about platforms. I firmly believe that the time for buying many
different non-integrated tools is over. The time for teams working
together to bring automation and immediate response to the security
platform will bring much more tangible results to the security of any
environment. For instance, if a compromised device can immediately tell
Office 365 that it should not be able to be on the network, then
immediately cuts off the device from the environment, then also provides
shared data to all Azure AD customers, I’d say that’s a huge win. If
your security strategy is based on one tool needing to capture
incidents, put them in an incident management system, then someone read
it, then respond… you’re already too far behind.
Here is a best practice kill chain.
You can see how every step the compromised machine is stopped. The
machine cuts itself off, the other machine blocks it, Office 365 stops
it, and non-identifying information is shared to other organizations to
protect them too.
A related platform that was recently released at RSA from the Microsoft Office 365 security team is Insider Risk Management. Check it out, especially for understanding what you need to prevent before it happens.
Change 6: Modern Product Security
People aren’t building new products on Windows domain joined virtual
servers anymore. Yes, many of the current security threats attack that
surface, which is why changes 1 – 5 are so important. That said, we
need to protect the applications being built now, which represent the
way we’re presenting our companies in the digital market. The modern
platforms are built on concepts like containers, serverless,
identity, and SaaS distributed architectures. These architectures are
being used for internal and external applications. Your security
strategy should treat every application like an application you are
building to serve an external audience and understand the modern
structures surrounding this.
You can see here the various layers of protection a modern app should
have before it ever gives information to an internal or external user.
Most apps traditionally built for an internal audience do not have even
close to this number of layers and that isn’t a good thing. The lack
of protection for our legacy apps represents a serious failing in how
we’ve built architectures historically. A few aspects of this:
Cloud protection with risk inputs
App firewall characteristics
Identity as a platform and conditional access
Layers of exposure in your application or services
Functions and exposure model
Data behind the application
Integrations into other apps and data
Back door access that exposes the platform
This is represented below: Some of the considerations in modern container security include:
Cluster design
Container network design
Cluster RBAC
Security for deployment tech
Secrets management
Secure images & evaluation
Runtime privileges
Pod security
Governance applied through ARM
Secure coding and access models
In the serverless space, similarly there are serious advantages, but also considerations. The advantages / comparison includes:
Remember that these scenarios include truly driving secure code that
runs on secure platforms. Also, pairing these modern platforms with
modern ways of responding to threats attacking them and trying to gain
access to your customer data.
The construction of a modern product is going to continue to
evolve and move further into even more distributed architectures that
leverage mult-party contracts and relationships, such as in Blockchain.
The security organization needs to prepare itself for this reality.
Change 7: Policy Enforcement Based Security
With the shift of the IT organization from delivery to enablement the
security organization needs to be prepared to deal with an even broader
set of potential stakeholders. Many of the ways that the security
organization has looked to implement policies won’t work in the modern
provisioning ecosystem (some will say they’ve never worked).
The IT organization is shifting to implement controls through a
governable platform, but one that facilitates sufficient control. If
you examine the maturity curve below, you’ll see in the middle the point
where the business has implemented controls that enable the business on
a cloud platform. If you aren’t there, you need to get there in short
order.
The appropriate operationalized cloud is one that leans on best
practices of infrastructure/app/configuration-as-code as the mechanism
of deployment, allowing for governance of the deployed solution. In
addition, at the point of deployment the governance rules are applied
and block configurations that do not align with security policies.
The implementation of the goal state facilitates the necessary
oversight from the governing security and IT organizations, but lets the
application owner have the opportunity to properly direct and build
applications that suit the needs of their customers. The security
organization is then aiding the business in responding to security
incidents based on information sources from governance, policy,
compliance, and intrusion, but implementing as much of the response as
possible through automation, as human-centric responses are typically
too slow.
Change 8: Think Content Not Storage Location
The next change is about content. Take one of your critical
financial documents… how have you secured it? Have you placed it in a
file share or a document library with constrained access? What happens
when that document is moved out of the secure location? In
most scenarios the content is now available to be used by whomever wants
to use it. Now consider a modern solution that wraps content based on what it is, who is accessing it, where they are access it from, and the health of the system they are using to access it. Technologies like Microsoft Information Protection can provide this capability to a productivity environment… even finding the documents so you don’t have to.
Consider the following diagram, with content leaving the location, but still protected vs. the unprotected document.
You can see in the above that even though we’ve transferred the file
to an individual using the content from an un-managed location we’re
still applying who, what, where, and health to file access. This is
critical to leverage with the mobility of content and the understanding
that the location is always temporary.
Change 9: Data Security
We are experiencing an unprecedented opportunity to leverage data to
better our companies, customers, and employees. In the same vain
however we have a tremendous risk attached to implementing appropriate data governance surrounding what we expose and to whom. A few trends I’m seeing in this space that I think are important to consider:
Understand the security categories of your data
Understand how that secure data is used and where
Understand how you are scoping access to the critical data
Expose data in sets centric to the users who need it, not the entire lake
Understand where controls can be placed over exposed data
Understand the data controls for the platform itself
Implement overall data controls for exposure
Filter user experiences based on role and function
Facilitate an understanding of how data was acquired
Be able to audit access to critical data via platform monitoring
Understand the modern data architecture for access
Understand conditional access controls to data access layers
There certainly are more, but to prepare yourself in this space is to
be positioned to deal both with preventing a security incident and
understanding one if it occurs. To be caught unprepared is to put
yourself in a position to not understand what you are protecting, let
alone trying to protect it. The cloud makes this harder in a sense, but
also easier because you can apply controls and audit what you couldn’t
do well before.
Change 10: Risk Based Management
By this I don’t mean applying an audit methodology. I mean starting
with the end in mind. What do you want to prevent? What is the most likely threat? How do I prevent that threat from occuring and wondering, what should
I have done? This is the root of what a CISO needs to be thinking
about daily. I believe the bold CISOs are looking at the themes we
identified above and assertively working to adopt technology that
reduces the attack surface and architecturally mitigates threats vs.
just applying minor changes. Still operating a legacy end user
computing environment like most of the world? Change it. Still not
doing micro-network segmentation and moving to the cloud? Change it.
Still not doing conditional access for your Office 365 environment?
Change it. Now is the time. Take a good, hard look at your business,
understand the most likely threats, where your critical data resides,
and take steps to prevent it before there is a significant disaster.
Yes, we want to innovate, and we should, but if you don’t take steps to
protect yourself in a serious and intentional way, you won’t make the
difference necessary. Attacking change and most likely risks isn’t
about training, or an external audit, or a NIST based security program.
It’s about basic understanding of where risks exist and the tenacity to
address them.
As with any programming language, code will have errors and
troubleshooting those problems can be difficult. Thankfully, PowerShell
has a rich error object and several powerful tools to help debug your
code.
With PowerShell , these tools become
even more useful and error handling even easier. As the language
evolves and becomes used in more places than ever, being able to quickly
and efficiently troubleshoot a problem will prove invaluable to
integrating the language into common workflows.
Terminating Errors
As you can see below, the text “This should never be shown” is not
shown, as the terminating error stops code execution. The function throw will always return a terminating error.
Non-Terminating Errors
It is more difficult to arbitrarily generate a non-terminating error, but one easy way is to use the Get-ChildItem cmdlet and ask the cmdlet to find a nonexistent directory. As you can tell the command Write-Host "This text will show!", does in fact appear.
Figure2 - Non-Terminating Error Output
You can turn most non-terminating errors into terminating errors by modifying an individual cmdlet’s ErrorAction to Stop. For example, Get-ChildItem "missing_dir" -ErrorAction 'Stop'
Error Views
You might notice that in the previous output, there are two different views of the error information. Figure 1 shows the NormalView of the $ErrorView
preference variable. This view was standard and traditional until
PowerShell . Starting with PowerShell , the default view has changed
to what you see in Figure 2 and that is of the ConciseView.
It dispenses with much of the decoration around the output, but as you
might be able to tell, some information is not made available.
The Error Object Behind the Scenes
Underlying the data behind the error output is the $Error
object that is populated by PowerShell when errors are thrown. To view
this data, you are able to output and walk through the information. The
traditional way to get the last error thrown is by calling $Error[0]. This uses array notation to reference the error.
Figure4 - $Error Object
If you happen to mistype this command, you will overwrite the first object in the error collection with the new error, so be careful when referencing this object.
As you can see there is the same error as originally shown, but we want to view more of the data. By selecting all of the properties, we are able to see what’s available. As we will talk about in the next section, the Get-Error cmdlet provides a rich view of this data, but it’s important to understand what is going on underneath.
Figure 5 – Error Object Properties
By walking through each property we can see what information exists between the Get-Error cmdlet and the $Error object itself.
Figure 6 – Error Object Exception Properties
The New Get-Error Cmdlet
That brings us to the next PowerShell addition and that is the Get-Error cmdlet. To expand upon the ConciseView and show far more detail, we can run the Get-Error cmdlet and see the expanded details of the last error thrown.
Figure 3 – Get-Error Output
There is a lot of information shown here, so let’s break down what is useful.
Exception
Type – Basic Exception Information
ErrorRecordMost of this information is from the $Error object itself. The TargetObject, CategoryInfo, and FullyQualifiedErrorId are all duplicated further in the Get-Error output. What is useful is the Exception data.
Type – An exception, but could be referencing the parent exception
Message – The human-readable error message
HResult – Traditional numerical error code that Windows has used since the early days of the operating system
ItemName – The same as the TargetObject shown later in the Get-Error output
SessionStateCategory – A series of values that errors fall into, this is an enum underneath
TargetSite – A set of information that exposes some of the internal PowerShell engine values and where the error itself is coming from
StackTrace – This is the actual method signature of where the error itself came from and can help aid in why an error was shown
Message – The human-readable error message
Source – This is the source of where the error is coming from
HResult – As discussed above, the traditional numerical error code from Windows
TargetObject
The object that the function, cmdlet, or code targets, in this case D:\\missing_dir
CategoryInfo
A concatenated view of several different properties, breaking down to the below format:
The FullyQualifiedErrorId is Message property of the exception object combined with the fully-qualified name of the class where the exception originated.
InvocationInfo
MyCommand – The originating cmdlet or function throwing the error
ScriptLineNumber – Location within the file or ScriptBlock that the error is thrown
OffsetInLine – The location within the line that the error was thrown
HistoryId – The location from within the Get-History cmdlet that the error was thrown
Line – The command throwing the error
PositionMessage – Combined information for the error
InvocationName – The cmdlet or function throwing the error
CommandOrigin – In what context the error was thrown
ScriptStackTrace
Contained here is information on where in a script the error occurred. In this case, the error occurred on line 1, but this will reflect the line of the error in the given ScriptBlock.
Conclusion
Unlike other programming languages,
PowerShell provides a very rich error object to figure out what went
wrong and help to debug troublesome code. With PowerShell, the ability
to decipher errors is even easier with the introduction of the Get-Error cmdlet. Furthermore, the ConciseView of the ErrorAction preference will keep the command line free from clutter and make coding even easier!
Run the following script in powershell to run the Action items.
Function Run-SCCMClientAction { [CmdletBinding()]
# Parameters used in this function param ( [Parameter(Position=0, Mandatory = $True, HelpMessage="Provide server names", ValueFromPipeline = $true)] [string[]]$Computername,
In every organization, the possibility of role changes or change of contact information can occur quite frequently.AzureAD Connect is a great tool that allows administrators to make said updates either on-premises or in cloud and will sync all changes accordingly. It can take up to 30 minutes for Azure Active Directory to update these changes when these changes are applied on the on-premises Active Directory instance and vice-versa via AzureAD Connect. It can also take up to an additional 30 minutes to then sync changes with Office 365. This post will detail steps to force AzureAD Connect to sync on command when required via PowerShell to combat the delay.
Lets begin.
Run PowerShell
Run PowerShell
Run the following command to install the AzureAD Sync module:
Import-Module ADSync
Next lets review the current intervals AzureAD Connect uses to sync by running the following command.
Get-ADSyncScheduler
NOTE:The report should show intervals of 30 minute syncs and a sync policy type of Delta. A sync policy type of Initial is usually shown after AzureAD Connect's initial sync but can also be forced as detailed in the next step.
Now run the following command to initialize the AzureAD Sync immediately.
The process of a Windows client selecting an Active Directory domain
controller isn't too complex but is often not fully understood. Let's
look at the way a member server chooses a DC and how this affects
applications.
Why it Matters
Windows will optimize connections to the best available domain controller for the following types of situations:
Authentication for users logging directly into the server
Authentication for users accessing the applications on the server (such as SharePoint or Exchange)
Group policy processing for user accounts and the computer account
Promotion of a member server to a DC
For each of these, it is clearly important to try to use a DC that is
local to the member server. For example, you wouldn't want thousands
of Exchange authentications to be sent to a DC across the country if a
local one is available.
How it Works
When a member server or workstation needs to find a domain controller, it goes through the following steps:
Query the primary DNS server for the all domain controller SRV records in the domain (These have the format of "_ldap._tcp.mydomain.local")
This will return an entry for each DC in the domain. For example,
this screenshot shows the lookup result for a domain with 2 DCs, named
MGLABDC4 and MGLABDC5:
Select the first DC in DNS result list and connect to it via LDAP
Determine if the chosen DC is in the same site as the member
server, based on the information configured in AD Sites & Services
If so, the member server begins using that DC for communications
If not, the DC tells member server what site it is in
Member server sends new DNS query for the list of DCs specifically in its own site
Member server selects the first DC in DNS result list and connects to it via LDAP
If no DC in the local site is available, connect to any DC in the domain
Cache the name of the local site in the registry to speed up future operations
If the client attempts to contact a DC that's offline, it will try to
contact the next one in the list until all results are exhausted.
Here is a screenshot from a member server showing how the server is preferring the DC in its local site.
A common misconception is that Windows clients will use their configured
DNS servers as their primary DCs. As you can see by the above process,
this is not the case. The member server will query its
configured DNS server to retrieve a list of DCs and then intelligently
choose the correct DC based on the site information.
Commands to Help
To help view and diagnose how a member server is locating its DC, try the following commands
echo %logonserver% - This shows the DC that was used to authenticate and log in the current user
nltest /dsgetsite - This shows the AD site that the current server has detected that it's in
nltest /dclist: (include the colon
at the end) - This shows the list of DCs in the current domain,
including which site each is in. In this example, MGLABDC4 is in the
MG-AZ-EASTUS site, and MGLABDC5 is in the MG-AZ-EASTUS2 site.
nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.mydomain.local.
- This will query the primary DNS server for all domain controller SRV
records. This should return all of the DCs in the domain. In this
example, MGLABDC4 and MGLABDC5 are returned.
nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.mysitename._sites.dc._msdcs.mydomain.local.
- This will query the primary DNS server for domain controllers that
are registered in "mysitename". In this example, only MGLABDC4 is in
the site that was queried, which matches the information we found with
nltest /dclist: previously.
Configuration
How do you ensure that all of this happens smoothly? The single most
important thing to check is that AD Sites & Services is configured
correctly. You should review and confirm the following points:
All of the LAN subnets in the corporate network are defined in AD Sites & Services
Each of those subnets is configured for the correct AD Site
Each site with a significant number of clients has a local DC to authenticate with
If the Windows client's IP address doesn't match to a subnet defined
in the AD configuration, it has no way of finding a the closest DC.
That can lead to unoptimized connections and slower logons and AD operations.
When a logon request is made to a domain, the workstation sends out a request to find a domain controller for the domain. The domain name is actually a NetBIOS name that is a 16-character name with the 16th character used by Microsoft networking services to identify the NetBIOS type.
For some reason some clients are not working as expected or working slower and you want to point client to different domain controller. To find out if any of the domain controllers is having problems you can quickly change the domain controller that the affected client is using.
Back in the day when Windows NT 4 ruled the world there was a command called setprfdc (set preferred domain controller) nltest does something similar.
So first we wanted to find out what DC the client is using. Now there are many different ways but here is a command that generally used: nltest /dsgetdc:domain.local
The output was:
DC: \\DC1.DOMAIN.local Address: \\10.111.1.200 Dom Guid: xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx Dom Name: DOMAIN.local Forest Name: DOMAIN.local Dc Site Name: Default-First-Site-Name Our Site Name: Interxion Flags: PDC GC DS LDAP KDC TIMESERV WRITABLE DNS_DC DNS_DOMAIN DNS_FOREST The command completed successfully.
This means that the client is using DC1. Now we wanted quickly to point the client to a different domain controller DC2. To do that write the following command:
nltest /Server:client0 /SC_RESET:domain.local\dc2
The output was:
Flags: 30 HAS_IP HAS_TIMESERVTrusted DC Name \\DC1.DOMAIN.local Trusted DC Connection Status Status = 0 0x0 NERR_Success The command completed successfully
If you run the first command again you should see that domain controller has changed.
